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Accomplishing Knowledge
A Framework for Investigating Knowing in Organizations

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This article proposes a shift in how researchers study knowledge and knowing in organizations. Responding to a pronounced lack of methodological guidance from existing research, this work develops a framework for analyzing situated organizational problem solving. This framework, rooted in social practice theory, focuses on communicative knowledge-accomplishing activities, which frame and respond to various problematic situations. Vignettes drawn from a call center demonstrate the value of the framework, which can advance practice-oriented research on knowledge and knowing by helping it break with dubious assumptions about knowledge homogeneity within groups, examine knowing as instrumental action and involvement in a struggle over meaning, and display how patterns of knowledge-accomplishing activities can generate unintended organizational consequences.

Keywords: knowledge; power; social practice theory; pragmatism

The vast majority of studies on knowledge in organizations begin with assertions about a large-scale transformation toward an information society, which leads them to argue that organizational existence and competitive advantage revolve around knowledge. From there, these studies
typically codify a given organization’s knowledge; investigate how knowledge moves across boundaries; and suggest routes by which knowledge can be measured, extracted, accumulated, and managed. These interests generally assume that knowledge is a commodity and that competitive advantage results from a greater or more creative collection of it. Like other objects, knowledge can be possessed, stored, and transferred, though its cognitive location can create challenges for its retrieval and use (Maier, Prange, & von Rosenstiel, 2001; Nonaka, 1994).

Recently, however, an alternative vision has emerged to argue that knowledge includes more than what can be captured in cognition. Based in theories of social practice from the likes of Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Bourdieu, and Giddens, this view foregrounds the complex interactive processes used to access, create, and apply knowledge in organizational problem solving (see Brown & Duguid, 1991, 2001; Jarzabkowski, 2005; Nickerson & Zenger, 2004). Rather than an object or an entity, knowledge is “emergent, intersubjectively negotiated and continually in flux” (Ewenstein & Whyte, 2007, p. 705).

This practice-based alternative makes three important contributions to organization theory. First, it shows how knowledge is always a part of problem-oriented action. From a practice perspective, understanding knowledge requires a concomitant investigation of knowing. The verb knowing suggests action as the active and ongoing accomplishment of problem solving, whereas the noun knowledge connotes stable objects, facts, and dispositions (Cook & Brown, 1999; Gherardi, 2000). From this perspective, knowledge is a capacity to act within a situation. A capacity to act depends on one’s being able to make distinctions between the useful and the useless and to effect change in the service of solving problems, which are not necessarily based in discursive awareness (Giddens, 1984; Tsoukas, 2000). For example, Orlikowski (2002) identified five problem-solving practices that generated a collective competence in a globally distributed software firm. Arguing that organizations’ distinctive capabilities are dynamic, provisional, and continually created in practice, she concluded that studying organizational competencies requires understanding the conditions under which skillful performance is more or less likely. Specifically, Orlikowski showed that personal and organizational knowledge potentialities allow actors to intelligently engage in problem-focused action.

A second contribution involves the close connection between knowledge and community. Communities shape interpretations of events, conceptions of competence, and what counts as appropriate action (Reckwitz, 2002; Wenger, 1998). Knowledge is deeply social, which helps us to understand
how communities turn novices into experts, how actors incorporate the context into problem solving, and how knowledge linked to local practices can make working across boundaries problematic (e.g., Cook & Yanow, 1993). For example, in his investigation of cross-functional work at an automobile manufacturer, Carlile (2002) found that boundary objects—artifacts shareable across problem-solving contexts—enable a shared language, a view of differences, and a process that can alter individuals’ knowledge. Because much knowledge was community specific, boundary objects took on special organizational importance. Such a consideration of the community’s structuring of knowledge is absent in most cognitive work.

A third contribution of a practice-based view is that knowledge in a given context is simply that which enables and sustains problem solving and not necessarily that which can be independently justified as true. For pragmatists, knowledge provides an ability to engage in and to overcome obstacles to ongoing practice (Lave, 1988; Rorty, 1999; Wicks & Freeman, 1998). Orr’s study (1996) of Xerox photocopier technicians exhibits finding this nicely. In observing technicians’ attempts to repair copiers, Orr found that the technicians frequently used storytelling among one another rather than referring to product manuals or formal training. Their concern was less with using canonical knowledge than it was with developing the practical insights that enable action. Orr’s portrayal of knowledge as a matter of conversation and social practice emphasizes the importance of research that traces knowledge as being constructed in and through communication processes.

With these three insights, the practice-based view produces innovative research (Nicolini, Gherardi, & Yanow, 2003; Sachs, 1995), but the perspective is not without its critics. Most criticisms raise methodological concerns. One argument contends that extant operational definitions of knowledge and knowing tend to be vague, failing to make meaningful analytical distinctions between action and knowledge (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2001; Schreyögg & Geiger, 2007; Tsoukas & Vladimirou, 2001). A second concern contends that practice-based studies have not been accompanied by methodologies of sufficient complexity or that the plethora of conceptual development makes comparison across studies difficult (e.g., Corman, Kuhn, McPhee, & Dooley, 2002; Grandori & Kogut, 2002; Patriotta, 2004). And a third set of critiques asserts that existing models for investigating knowing are built on simplistic assumptions about intracommunity consensus that prevent examinations of power (e.g., Contu & Willmott, 2003, 2006; Fox, 2000; Handley, Sturdy, Fincham, & Clark, 2006; Østerlund & Carlile, 2005). Although not all practice-oriented research suffers from these shortcomings, we suggest that existing work provides few explicit
methodological frameworks for researchers. A methodological contribution is needed to aid individual studies and contribute to the development of the practice-based perspective.

We respond by developing an analytical framework (Ragin, 1994) that can guide examinations of knowing, defined as *situated problem solving* at the micro level. In the next section, we articulate our framework by attending to variations in problematic situations and the knowledge-accomplishing activities that create and reclaim capacities to act. We then illustrate its utility in research, in terms of its methodological merit and its heuristic value, with instances of problem solving in a call center. From these instances, we draw some general guidelines for research using this framework. Finally, we show how our framework can enable researchers to address diversity, power, and unintended consequences in organizational knowing.

**A Framework for Practice-Based Research on Knowing**

The practice-based view portrays knowledge and knowing in a manner that is unique and challenging to traditional thinking. In this section, we present a framework for examining knowing as micro-level problem solving. We first describe how various sorts of problematic situations emerge in interaction. We next identify four forms of knowledge-accomplishing activity in organizational actions that respond to the features of problematic situations, and then we show how users of this framework can examine power.

**The Centrality of Problematic Situations**

Practice theorists and pragmatists posit that problematic situations are fundamental starting points for social action (Cronen & Chetro-Szivos, 2001; Dewey, 1938; Fisher, 1982). A problematic situation is the state of affairs formed by a stream of past and projected practices in which actors perceive a need to take action to address a threat (current or potential) to ongoing action. Problematic situations emerge (and are transformed) in interaction constructed by individuals who find their purposes and actions linked (Giddens, 1984) and shaped by the “culturally constituted relations of persons, settings, and activity” (Suchman, 1996, p. 56).4 Furthermore, different situations evoke different problem-solving approaches, because settings supply resources that people use to define problems and craft solutions (Hutchins, 1990; Lave, 1988). Variations across problematic
situations imply differences that make some situations appear open and unstructured and others straightforward and closed.

One approach to conceptualizing situations derives from Lazega’s *Micropolitics of Knowledge* (1992), which shows how situations are defined by interactional claims on activity, which in turn depend on resources in the organizational context that shape three situational features: actors’ identifications, the legitimacy of their action, and sources of their accountability. These features detail the stream of past and projected practices of a problematic situation. Lazega’s conceptualization is particularly useful because Lazega explicitly links the process of defining situations to knowledge claims (and thus aligns with the notion that knowledge is always grounded in the community). A person’s claim to knowledgeability in a given setting takes the form of appropriateness (as judged by the community) regarding the information content of that person’s messages for problem-solving moves. Power is central here because in organizations, “vested—but not rigidly organized—interests vie for influence and control in the process of defining the situation” (p. 12).

In Lazega’s conceptualization (1992), three overlapping situational features shape judgments of appropriateness. First, actors assess their own and one another’s identifications as they frame situations. Identities are allegiances, manifest in talk, that index an organization’s control over individuals. Actors assess discursively produced identifications to predict others’ likely action and interpretation and to project valued identities as they frame situations (Alvesson, 1993). Second, the legitimacy of action refers to its motivation. Actors tacitly ask, “What does the group or organization expect of me here?” Third, sources of accountability acknowledge that individuals look to particular members of an audience for direction and validation. People perform for a constituency, and the influence that management, customers, peers, or regulators (for instance) hold helps to define the situation. In a sense, then, Lazega’s approach elaborates Garfinkel (1967), who encourages us to see situations as not being simply given but as actively being constituted by the accounts’ underlying action.

Consequently, when we discuss framing a situation, we mean the negotiations of these three resources and the resulting judgments regarding the appropriateness of discursive moves. As problem solving unfolds, similarities and differences between participants emerge about relating to each other and about organizing and presenting information. This ongoing process therefore implies continuous demands of negotiation and possibilities of reframing (Gumperz & Cook-Gumperz, 1982), particularly when considering the influence of existing collective interpretations and solutions...
(Hargadon & Bechky, 2006). Given this assertion, we propose that differences in appropriateness judgments correspond to varying levels of situational determinacy, the level of which is a function of the configuration of the three situation-framing resources.

**Determinate situations.** Many circumstances appear routine and mundane, such that necessary action seems straightforward. We term these determinate situations because the activity required to respond to the normative claim on appropriateness appears, in the actors’ discourse, to be simple and determined by the nature of the situation. The resources of identifications, legitimacy, and accountability are framed as being unproblematic; participants evince confidence that others will employ similar interpretive schemes, use a common code, agree about the grounds and meanings of activity, and understand the action requirements. A determinate situation appears to call for action, but people’s tools and procedures structure interpretation in such a way that responses appear clear-cut.

For example, Hutchins and Klausen’s description (1996) of distributed cognitive labor in a simulated airline cockpit found a highly determinate situation: The crew shared expectations for roles, the meanings of activities, and the proper unfolding of events. A critical observation was that even when the crew encountered an unexpected message, shared background and technical knowledge did not change; rather, these shared understandings enabled efficient processing of information across a variety of representational media (e.g., pilots, speech, artifacts). When events do not challenge shared understandings, the situation retains its level of determinacy in actors’ framing.

**Indeterminate situations.** A situation becomes increasingly indeterminate as the factors identified above erode: if actors do not agree about the identifications grounding their coordinated action, if they cannot anticipate the moves of others, if they do not agree about the meaning of their activity, or if they do not understand the requirements or resources needed to realize a capacity to act. In other words, interpretations of and responses to a problematic situation are less clear when there are multiple and conflicting identities, when the validation of action is uncertain, and when ambiguity marks both role requirements and action scripts. In highly indeterminate situations, information transmission will never be adequate—no matter the amount transmitted or the manner of its transmission—because what counts as being relevant or useful is not held in common by the actors (Lee, 2000).
Many organizational situations display some level of indeterminacy. For example, when members possess incommensurate technological frames (Orlikowski & Gash, 1994), when they respond with cynicism to organizational action (Bain & Taylor, 2000; Fleming & Spicer, 2003), and when their participation is fluid over time (M. D. Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972), constructing shared and stable visions of problematic situations will prove difficult. Responses to indeterminate situations generally require actors to resolve ambiguity and invent responses; alternatively, people often seek instruction and direction from those who can productively manage complexity (Weick, 1978). And although discursive moves frequently make situations controllable (i.e., more determinate), sometimes the very actions designed to address ambiguity can make a situation more complicated and indeterminate. In the next section, we consider four sorts of actions that respond to and construct situations.

**Knowledge-Accomplishing Activities as Units of Analysis**

Figure 1 depicts our framework for the micro-level analysis of knowing. To explain this model, we begin by suggesting that *episodes* of interaction are conceptually useful foci because they enable analyses of action, problem solving, and community context. Indeed, Harrè and Secord (1972) propose the episode as the site in which we should examine all social life. As such,

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**Figure 1**

**Episodes of Knowledge Accomplishing Activity as a Function of Determinacy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Determinacy</th>
<th>Function of claims on or resources for</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Identification, Legitimacy, Accountability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Determinacy**

- Function of claims on or resources for
  - Identification
  - Legitimacy
  - Accountability

**Problematic Situation**

- Threat or obstacle to ability to go on
- Shaped by past and projected future practices

**Knowledge Deployment**

- Information transmission
- Information request

**Knowledge Development**

- Instruction
- Improvisation

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we adopt the episode as the appropriate segment for the micro-level analysis of knowing. Knowledge episodes arise in the event of a problematic situation; they move from initiation to termination; and they display the continuous nature of system structuring (Knorr-Cetina, 1981; Pentland, 1992, 1995). The interaction that composes knowledge episodes results from situational features and from the capacities of the individuals involved.5

Within knowledge episodes, discursive moves frame, reframe, and resolve perceived problematic situations. These discursive moves are *knowledge-accomplishing activities*: segments of episodes in which discursive moves apply and/or generate knowledge in an attempt to realize a capacity to act. *Accomplishing* connotes the performance of pragmatic action geared toward a sensed deficiency (or threat) in capacity to act; problem-solving activities attempt to achieve that capacity. The deficiency to which we refer here can be located in oneself, in another, or even in a collective. Indeed, as J. R. Taylor, Groeleau, Heaton, and Van Every (2001) argue, knowledge often consists of recognizing and acting on patterns and anomalies of organizational practice. Of course, not all knowledge-accomplishing activities resolve dilemmas and remove obstacles to action (i.e., they do not always bring episodes to a close). But it is the offering, interpreting, and perceived cash value (James, 1907/1995) of the knowledge signaled in the moves that give existence and status to things and people while simultaneously ordering the environment (Alvesson, 2001; Lanzara & Patriotta, 2001).6

**Forms of knowledge deployment: Information transmission and information request.** In determinate situations, knowledge accomplishing proceeds in a typical and patterned fashion, as is the case when retail clerks recite standard responses to common customer requests. In determinate situations, knowledge accomplishing is a matter of knowledge deployment. Two types of moves characterizing deployment are those of *information transmission* and *information request*. Conveying information between persons (or between artifacts and persons) is perceived by actors to be sufficient for overcoming obstacles and realizing a capacity to act. Practices look like a simple transfer of information when the system is structured to permit such ease of exchange. When a person translates information to meet the demands of the moment, action can proceed relatively uninterrupted (Yanow, 2004).7

**Forms of knowledge development: Instruction and improvisation.** Indeterminate situations are characterized by ambiguous resources for identifications,
accountability, and legitimation. Perrow (1967) suggests that in such situations, a problem is “so vague and poorly conceptualized as to make it virtually unanalyzable. . . . No ‘formal’ search is undertaken, but instead one draws upon the residue of unanalyzed experience or intuition, or relies upon chance and guesswork” (p. 196). People generally seek to establish determinate situations (Heritage, 1984). However, when the conditions shaping a determinate situation fail to materialize, when they erode, or when they are altered by events, knowledge-accomplishing activity characterized as deployment will generally be judged inadequate, and the development of new knowledge (our second broad category of knowledge-accomplishing activity) will be required.8

The first form of development is that of instruction. Here, actors seek out those who appear to possess the requisite information or who can manage the ambiguity; in such cases, knowing who knows what (e.g., Contractor & Monge, 2002) becomes key to understanding a system. Instruction tends to occur in situations of moderate indeterminacy, when sources of identification, accountability, and legitimacy are called into question and when there is some incentive to permanently improve another’s resources for knowledge accomplishing.

A second form of development, improvisation, occurs when resources for identification, accountability, and legitimacy are challenged, are unclear, or are not similarly understood by parties. Although some organizational activities (such as crises) produce confusion or ambiguity, almost by definition, most indeterminate situations are marked by initial expectations that action will proceed smoothly (Drew & Heritage, 1992). When new events, discursive moves, or recalcitrant artifacts violate these expectations, conventional grounds for action are disrupted. Although many knowledge-based interventions seek to eliminate uncertainty, ambiguity can present opportunities to challenge and reinvent received knowledge (Eisenberg, 1998). Indeterminate situations therefore need not be studied merely as thorny problems but can instead be seen as sites in which innovative knowledge accomplishment can occur.

Knowledge-Accomplishing Activity and Power

Those who view the construction of knowledge in organizations as a struggle over meaning do not generally examine patterns of micro-level problem solving in context (Barley & Kunda, 2001; for an exception, see Engeström, 1990, 1996). At the same time, many who examine patterns of micro-level problem solving in context ignore the organizational imperatives
guiding practice or assume a functional consensus within communities (Contu & Willmott, 2003; Fox, 2000; McPhee, Myers, & Trethewey, 2006; Østerlund & Carlile, 2005; Schultze & Leidner, 2002). Our framework helps bridge this gap. By attending to organizationally specific resources for identification, legitimacy, and accountability, the framework supports examination of the political nature of knowing because shaping the situational resources upon which interpretation and action proceed is a distinctive form of power. Using the framework in this way opens a second level of analysis, which understands knowledge-accomplishing activities as shaping and framing resources that proffer particular models of appropriate action.

For this level, actors frame situations through classifications and discursive closures. The authority to classify events, objects, and people into types or grades is often granted to management. Certainly, classification is necessary to systematize, coordinate, and control activity (indeed, knowing depends on making distinctions and categorizations; Sacks, 1992; Tsoukas & Vladimirou, 2001) and classificatory schemes often carry with them histories of reducing ambiguity and idiosyncrasy. This much is fairly obvious. But when a system’s classifications embed domination into the very resources used for identification, legitimacy, and accountability, exposing those classifications and their consequences becomes both possible and interesting. Classifications of persons (e.g., by ethnicity, collar color, leadership ability, professional status) do not therefore merely create hierarchies and divide tasks; they also discipline work by enforcing appropriate interpretation, action, and self-construction (Suchman, 1994; Townley, 1993). Thus, classifications make claims on identities and discursive moves during knowledge episodes such that particular and often dominant expressions are elicited, fostered, promoted, discouraged, or resisted (Forrester & Ramsden, 2001).

In knowledge development, organizational struggles over meaning are likely to be accessible to observers (Lyon, 2005). Situation-framing resources, which guide and distort knowledge-accomplishing activities by privileging particular interests, are frequently explicit in interaction. One way to understand these struggles over meaning and the meaning distortions occasioned by power is through consideration of discursive closures in discussion. Deetz (1992) identifies several forms of discursive closure, all of which suppress potential conflict and action possibilities, the formulation of problems, the questioning of possible responses, the inclusion of diverse voices, and the examination of significance (Forester, 1993). Closures frequently reproduce the systems of authority on which the situation-framing resources are based, which potentially obscures and reifies power.
relations. Thackaberry’s study (2004) of a U.S. Forest Service self-study, for instance, noted the possibility of moments of productive change (i.e., knowledge development) that were often subject to the active denial of new knowledge through several forms of discursive closure.

The framework that we advance provides a systematic conceptual grounding for a practice-based method to study knowledge. In this section, we discussed three situation-framing resources and the formation of determinate and indeterminate situations; defined four types of knowledge-accomplishing activities that respond to situations of varying determinacy; and showed how to examine struggles over meaning through the vehicles of classifications, discursive closure, and the three situation-framing resources. In the next section, we display the utility of the framework as we consider practices of knowing in a call center.

**Illustrating the Knowledge-Accomplishing Framework**

The Help Center is a relatively small call center providing computing and telecommunication assistance to faculty, staff, and students at a large U.S. university. We observed work in the Help Center for an average of 10 hr a week for 3 months during all hours of operation, and we recorded and transcribed calls for 42 days. This Help Center was staffed by 13 representatives, or reps, comprising two full-time career employees and 11 undergraduate students who worked part-time. The workspace could accommodate nine reps, though there were most often between four and eight reps working at any time. The two career reps, Betty and Jane, sat at cubicles in the corners of the room, the only owned and personalized spaces; student reps sat at any workstations that were open at the beginning of their shifts. Workstations consisted of phones, headsets, and computers running different operating systems networked to a central server, which stored a database (designed by the career reps) of information relevant to problem solving, along with a system for documenting call results. We observed all practices in the center, including reps fielding calls, interacting nonverbally, and working collaboratively, as well as the work and nonwork activities occurring between calls. In keeping with our claim that episodes are necessary to study the micro-level analysis of knowing, we present vignettes drawn from these data to demonstrate how to use the knowledge-accomplishing framework to recognize and analyze knowing within ongoing organizational practice. These episodes illustrate our framework’s
methodological and heuristic value while positioning the framework for systematic testing in subsequent research.

**Information Transmission and Information Requests**

Consider the following problem-solving exchange:

Rep: Help Center, this is Betty.
Caller: I was calling, I have a, I have a class web page up on, uh [server name] that I don’t know how to FTP into. I know that’s it’s out on the engineering, um, directory and, um, my log-in gets me into, um, the proper area but well, not the proper area; it gets me into my mail area, but I don’t know how to get out, um, to FTP that.
Rep: Okay, what’s the URL?
Caller: The URL is www dot [university] dot edu slash [department], slash capital e, t, h.
Rep: [Types this into her computer] Okay, okay . . . um, uh, what you need to do is, is change directories, and the directory you need to go to is forward slash, h, t, docs—d, o, c, s—forward slash engineering, forward slash in capital letters e, t, h, okay, and there is where you’re gonna find the, those, those web pages. Okay?
Caller: Yep, okay. Thanks.
Rep: Okay—all right, thanks so much. Bye.

Notice here Betty’s swift, straightforward, and easy response to the caller’s problem. This call was successful but unremarkable. Although other reps heard the call, no one remarked on it to Betty or to anyone else, and Betty said nothing about it afterward. She resolved it by searching the online assistance system and transmitting information to the caller. Knowledge (rendered as information) was simply deployed without interrogation. This is information transmission. The caller and rep displayed no disagreement about roles, their language use appeared straightforward and uncontested, and both seemed to understand and abide by the nature of the interaction. Moreover, the caller displayed some level of competence with the issue, including an understanding of server directories, HTML code, and file transfers. Though it is possible that the caller may have feigned understanding, the pragmatic effect is the same as if full sharing were the case: The technical knowledge presented by the rep provided resolution insofar as the caller perceived that action was now possible. In short, because both sides signaled that the knowledge-accomplishing moves were unproblematic, a simple transfer of information sufficed.
Although this is a highly determinate knowledge-accomplishing situation, careful scrutiny reveals that the communicative practice is surprisingly intricate. First, callers and reps must signal that they possess sufficiently similar understandings of each other’s roles and the purposes of such calls and that they share background assumptions regarding interaction scripts, ascribed motivations, and the use of a common code. But furthermore, they must be able to calibrate talk to match the continual assessment and resolution of the incapacity to act.

Framing determinate situations. In determinate situations, an actor’s awareness of and certainty about how to use capacities to act (knowing how) depends on a wealth of contextual, experiential, and technical knowledge, along with a faith that others in the situation share understandings of that knowledge. Determinate situations exist when actors interact as though possessing the right information will provide the capacity to act and as though the locating and transmitting of that information is unproblematic. For example, the most common form of interaction among the reps was that of information requests, in which the rep would place a caller on hold, turn to another rep who seemed unoccupied, and ask a direct and unambiguous question. If the other offered a response, the information was usually simply passed to the caller.

Information transmission and information requests depend on a complex set of situational factors, self-presentations, and implicit understandings and accommodations. Determinate situations are thus always practical achievements open to contestation and disruption, but their normalcy can lead scholars to overlook the complex organizing required to make transmission possible. Our framework provides the foundation from which researchers may communicatively disassemble transfer as a component of knowing.

Determinate situations and power. We observed one rep put a caller on hold while he searched a manufacturer’s Web site for information on a printer problem. He read from an online manual, walking the caller through a several-step procedure. As the call concluded, the caller asked how the rep knew the steps; he replied, “I’m reading the manual. It’s online and I pulled it up.” Afterward, the rep turned to the others in the room and sarcastically recounted, “‘How did you know about my printer problem?’ I looked at the manual, the same one you should have looked at before calling!” As he swiveled back to his terminal, he said, “Stupid people!”—although no other reps visibly or audibly acknowledged his remark.
Information, taken for granted as being obvious and unquestioned, is a resource for power in determinate situations. Working solely from assumptions connecting knowledge with information access, the rep displayed antipathy toward the caller behind the scenes, as is standard practice in customer service work (P. Taylor, Hyman, Mulvey, & Bain, 2002). Seen as resistance against a classification—his service position in relation to the caller, despite the caller’s lack of initiative—the “stupid people” comment might seem to merely express frustration over the lack of process control in his work. However, the knowledge-accomplishing framework shows that such a statement performs additional work with regard to identification and legitimacy: It is both a self-portrayal of the rep as a loyal compatriot and a recognition that disdain during calls is inappropriate.9 The continued construction of reps’ being superior to callers could contribute to future disqualification (Deetz, 1992) because it could feasibly become easier for reps to construct callers as lacking legitimate standing.

**Instruction**

The knowledge-accomplishing activity of instruction characterizes moderately indeterminate situations. Instruction is likely to occur when resources for accountability include differences in expertise and where actors perceived problem-solving lessons as being legitimate. In the following example, Betty is interacting with Steve, a novice rep, about a protocol that he violated regarding prematurely escalating a case to on-site service, the next level of technical support. Jane, the other career rep, is listening in. Betty appears irritated and the following ensues:

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Betty: Now, Steve, did you get a call from [caller name]?
Steve: Oh . . . yeah.
Betty: Well, you need to look at the activity log and see what’s going on with the case already, because that case shouldn’t go to on-site service.

Jane [Listening in from the other side of the room]: Do you know how to do that already?

[Steve admits that he does not possess this knowledge; Betty and Jane then show him a Web page and explain activity logs, along with the sorts of calls that qualify for being passed to on-site service.]

Steve: Sorry, it’s my fault.
Betty: No, no, no, it’s just a training issue, Steve. No big deal. But this is something you’ll remember.
The problematic situation here involved a breakdown in the expected flow of activity, and the career reps were able to trace the problem to Steve’s incomplete knowledge of the appropriate response. Betty and Jane could appropriate the situation-framing resource of accountability here because they conducted the training program for each student rep and designed the training to create self-sufficiency in each. Even after training, they frequently eavesdropped on students’ calls to check on progress and to offer unsolicited advice. Such activities reinforced their expertise and an informal hierarchy. In this instance, Steve failed to perform as instructed, and so it was legitimate for career reps to hold him accountable, thereby shaping his capacity to act in subsequent practice. Steve’s improper handling of the call also created a question regarding identification because it displayed a lack of understanding of the implications for others.

The mild conflict in this vignette was resolved through knowledge-accomplishing activity that drew on unequal bases of power. Their status as experts gave the career reps influence and the ability to enforce authority (a resource of legitimacy). Steve’s deference reestablished the role and power structure in the system (accountability). Knowledge-accomplishing activity, as shown here, need not always involve an actor’s conscious search; in some circumstances, repercussions of actions for others trigger instructional moves that become imposed on a person.

Although instruction and information requests may appear similar, an important distinction involves the type of interactive move that, in the moment, creates teachers who instill lasting lessons in students. Specifically, we identify three characteristics of this type of move. First is that of self-presentation of an identity, either in the moment or over time, as one who seeks to teach or to be taught. For instance, one student rep, Nick, gained a reputation as an expert with Macintosh computers and became known as “the Mac guy.” After a complicated and prolonged problem-solving episode, Nick assumed the role of instructor when he drew a diagram for three reps, including one of the career reps, to teach them how to link a Mac and a PC through an Ethernet connection. A second characteristic is that of the assessment of an other’s (lack of) knowledgeability in comparison to the self, obtained interactively by reading cues such as lexicon. Such assessments shape the extent to which actors perceive instructional activities as being legitimate or futile. Third, instruction can be framed as a reasonable response to show how and to whom the other is accountable, as in the vignette involving Steve. In sum, if we understand instruction as an interactive response to a problematic situation, we can see how actors develop new capacities to act and how the display of authority structures a system.
Improvisation

Finally, we consider situations in which standard resources for problem solving are unavailable or unknown, and, therefore, knowledge-accomplishing activity requires improvisation. In organizational contexts typified by a high level of determinacy, an important additional component of improvisation is that of surprise. In the Help Center, for example, reps were trained to treat problems as possessing straightforward solutions; they were often astonished when technologies did not respond as predicted to scripted solutions provided by experts and manuals. In such situations, the result can be that what appears at first to be a determinate situation quickly becomes indeterminate as a function of the actors’ own knowledge-accomplishing activity.

To illustrate, we turn to an extended vignette featuring Sara, a relatively novice student rep, who fielded a call from a professor regarding posting material on a Web site for his course (see appendix). The ambiguity characterizing this interaction, at first glance, appears to be a simple case of either erroneous information on the caller’s part or the rep’s diagnostic incapacity. However, analysis of the situation as knowledge accomplishing reveals three factors that triggered not resolution but frustration.

A first factor triggering frustration was that of an inadequate and ambiguous demonstration of expertise and expectations of the actors: Both rep and caller expressed uncertainty and confusion about the problem throughout the 45-min call. Second, Sara quickly discovered that information transmission was impracticable because the caller complained about not understanding her (99.01) and that she spoke imprecisely (479.15) and too quickly (828.84). When Sara’s proposed solutions failed to remedy the situation, the caller expressed agitation; he questioned her knowledge and, in so doing, disrupted the legitimacy of action: “No—that’s completely bogus what you’re saying” (529.74). Although the rep did not allow the conflict to escalate, the challenge certainly enhanced feelings of uncertainty and lack of confidence on Sara’s part. Third, other reps engaged in what appeared to be a collaborative form of behind-the-scenes diagnosis (Cicourel, 1990) to address the growing indeterminacy. Sara requested information from others at three points during the call, highlighting her accountability to the collective and her identification with it. The information obtained at 459.28 about the file name was perhaps not erroneous, but Sara could not convey it in a way that aligned with the caller’s experience.

Ultimately, after attempting additional solutions and seeking assistance from others, Sara (working on Jane’s advice) concluded that the real problem
was that the caller did not have the authority to post information on the Web site, and she asked that he contact his department.

The challenges of this situation provided an occasion and a resource for knowledge-accomplishing activity: Although reps’ knowledge-accomplishing activities were aimed at locating the correct source of the caller’s problems, they likewise provided for members a sense of the distribution of expertise in the Help Center (shaping structured resources for accountability and legitimacy). Collaborations with other reps did not resolve the dilemma but salvaged a capacity to act because their suggestions enabled continued engagement with the caller. These community knowledge-accomplishing activities allowed Sara to engage in problem solving that eventually led to her knowledgeable conclusion about authorization as the cause of the problem. In the end, a problem diagnosis, constructed with others, returned the situation to seeming determinacy, and a relatively simple remedy was prescribed. Veridicality was by that point likely a secondary concern for her; the ability to “go on” (i.e., locate or create a pragmatic capacity to act) with whatever might assuage the caller was more likely to count as knowledge in the moment. Although this solution is not the sort of creative use of ambiguity associated with reinventing received knowledge (Eisenberg, 1998), it displays how new and fundamentally pragmatic knowledge is developed through situated problem-solving interaction.

Rarely did callers challenge and insult reps as the caller did in this vignette, but the institutionalized classifications legitimized this sort of talk—namely, professors are generally positioned above staff and students, and older male professors are especially advantaged when compared to younger female staff. It may seem curious that the rep did not seek to terminate the call or pass it off (cf. Pentland, 1992), but we can understand her not terminating the call if we realize that to do so would be anathema to the display of a competent identity in the Help Center. It seems therefore likely that these two impulses—the overt pressure from a high-status member of the broader community and subtle local community pressure to fulfill role expectations—combined to produce the aforementioned discursive closure called disqualification, when knowledge-accomplishing activities discount or exclude some participants’ contributions. The interaction appeared frustrating and stressful for all involved, but disqualification points out that this interaction likely reinforced existing control relations (e.g., accountability to external customers and internal authorities) while failing to produce anything approaching genuine mutual understanding.
Guidelines for Application of the Framework

In presenting this framework as a methodological contribution, our aim is to provide a resource for conception and analysis of studies about knowing in organizing. The Help Center vignettes illustrate the framework’s components and its analytical purchase; in this section, we develop general guidance for its use.

From the sections above, our focus on episodes of practice should be evident. An attention to episodes fits with methodological situationalism, which argues against the use of reflections and abstractions from action (e.g., interviews and documents) as a basis for understanding situated social practices (Knorr-Cetina, 1981). To employ our framework, then, one must have access to the interaction that constitutes episodes. As discussed above, employing our framework requires an ability to see actors defining and responding to a problematic situation. Consequently, a first step in analysis (as in Figure 1) is that of examining how actors frame a problem. In service-oriented work, as employed in this article, problem identification can be straightforward in other contexts because interaction revolves around client-initiated problems. As we have shown, however, even call center problem framing is communicatively complex, so a set of four landmarks for defining problems (Landry, 1995) can aid the task: first, a past, present, or future occurrence assessed negatively by an actor or group; second, uncertainty by at least one party regarding appropriate action; third, a consideration of ability to intervene; and, fourth, an expression of interest in committing resources to the intervention. A challenge to problem identification, however, is that these landmarks do not necessarily occur in sequence, are not always verbalized, and often occur outside any given researcher’s scrutiny.

In complex organizations, the problem identification task becomes even more difficult because the communication that identifies, constructs, and defines problems is likely to be spatially and temporally distributed. Thus, any investigation requires some informed method to accommodate this limitation and make the identification and examination of relevant episodes reasonable. For instance, meetings in which participants discuss how to address competitive pressures are preceded by informal conversations and agenda-setting messages (Boden, 1994; Corman & Scott, 1994; Weick, 1979), but a rationale for studying the meeting itself is that it is the locus for official sense making, identity performances, discursive closures, and construction as well as legitimation of action plans (Deetz, 1992; Schwartzman, 1989). In short, organizations do substantial knowledge accomplishing in meetings.
An additional methodological concern involves the need to study discursive moves over time. Episodes are made up of knowledge-accomplishing activities that are mediated by and productive of local situation-framing resources. Because communication performs framing and reframing functions as well as problem-solving functions, access to actual interaction rather than reports of interaction is desirable. Only with data on a series of moves (perhaps even over an extended period) could studies hope to understand the three themes of the practice literature mentioned above: the community-based interactive framing of problems, the dynamic and provisional nature of knowing, and the moves that pragmatically accomplish knowledge. In organizational meetings regarding competitive pressures, studies should then be particularly drawn to the moves that interrogate the problem, advance and foreclose particular interests, examine the quality of existing knowledge, and seek short- and long-term solutions.

Our framework provides a way to make sense of the variety of solution-oriented moves, from deploying commonly used tactics (e.g., seeking operational efficiencies) to developing new capacities to act (e.g., creating a new market or product lines), the conception of which depends on insight into the organization’s past and the encompassing resources in the scene. Used this way, the framework can highlight cases in which knowledge-accomplishing activities appear misaligned with the organization’s framing of the problem and when conversational moves suppress potentially productive conflict.

A final lesson returns to this section’s first point to suggest that interational data are necessary but not sufficient for using this framework. Tracing the structuring effects of resources for identifications, accountability, and legitimacy requires several data sources. These might include interview-based reflections, accounts of organizational histories, and analyses of the physical setting (Tyre & von Hippel, 1997). The point is that recognizing the situation-framing resources on which people draw can be a demanding research task that eludes the scope of solitary techniques.

**Implications for the Study of Knowledge in Organizing**

Using a practice orientation, our framework contributes to the practice-based study of organizational knowledge and knowing. We provide methodological guidance for researchers by making knowledge, context, and power observable in episodes of interaction. The framework provides a resource from which investigation may proceed and should thus be of interest to an
array of scholars. In this final section, we discuss three contributions that the framework offers to scholarship on knowing.

**Diverse Knowledge as Characteristic of Organizing**

As suggested above, studies of knowing tend to ignore knowledge diversity when they attend to community influences. In so doing, they oversimplify and sterilize practice. In our knowledge-accomplishing framework, however, diverse or heterogeneous knowledge is key to the conception of episodes and knowledge-accomplishing interaction. As people frame situations, differences in knowledge (e.g., expert/novice) and in approaches to problem solving (i.e., what is considered appropriate) frequently surface (Schön, 1983). These differences can be embraced, contested, or suppressed in interaction, and they tend to be clearly seen when new issues enter conversation or when knowledge-accomplishing activities are deemed inadequate.

In organization studies, knowledge heterogeneity has not been generally explored this way. Instead, research usually considers how people locate those who possess valuable knowledge (Child & Shumate, 2007; Palazzolo, Serb, She, Su, & Contractor, 2006) or how diversity generates creativity and change (Kuhn & Corman, 2003; Leonard, 1995). Our framework moves beyond these concerns to show how differentiation can contribute to indeterminacy and the inscription of power differences. Heterogeneous knowledge can lead to problem-solving ambiguity and hence to a perceived need for development as knowledge-accomplishing activity. Heterogeneity can lead to conflict (as in the vignette involving Sara), and it can make displays of expertise an important facet of work because assertions of expertise, via identification and legitimacy, may be necessary to validate personal knowledge against that of others (Alvesson, 2001).

In the Help Center, a few student reps possessed topic-specific expertise (e.g., Nick the Mac guy), but those with the most easily recognized knowledge were the two career reps. It is not surprising, then, that Betty and Jane saw other reps’ dilemmas as their responsibility to address. Thus, the interaction order developed such that student reps, particularly novices, treated the experts as oracles: When student reps reached an impasse, they routinely turned to Betty or Jane in the hope that information transmission would provide a capacity to act, which simultaneously reinforced existing classifications. By representing the experts’ knowledge as a commodity, the manner of its production was lost, as was an informed understanding of its practical applicability. The difficult work involved in generating knowledge
and rendering it transferable tended to be ignored. In such cases, the receiver ran the risk of appropriating information to solve a pressing problem without understanding situational contingencies and logics underlying procedures—a phenomenon not lost on practice-based theorists of learning (Lave, 1993). In sum then, the fact of heterogeneous knowledge in organizing carries valuable lessons for understanding knowing, and our framework can aid the production of insight into interactions creating and responding to this diversity.

**Power and Control as Inherent in Knowing**

A second conceptual contribution responds to the silence of much practice research on issues of power. Our framework enables analysis of how knowledge, or that which is taken to be knowledge, is communicatively constructed and how knowing gives preference to particular interests. Scholars who are seeking to frame knowledge-accomplishing activity as a struggle over meaning (e.g., Kinsella, 1999; Kuhn & Corman, 2003; Leonardi & Jackson, 2004) will find in this framework two moments that can serve as heuristics. First, as actors encounter and negotiate the contours of a problematic situation, their discursive moves necessarily employ classifications: They draw on subject positions, make linguistic distinctions, and employ forms of reasoning that are rendered invisible in most research on knowledge and knowing. The three situation-framing resources can provide a vocabulary for analyzing these moves. A second moment lies in the move (or moves) that bring a given episode to a close, or that which becomes the solution to a problematic situation, because such a statement will embody the knowledge seemingly adequate for the purposes.

With regard to this study in particular, these two moments can evince forms of discursive closure, such as disqualification, which occurred when people discounted the knowledge claims of those failing to align with resources for identification, legitimacy, and accountability. Pacification, too, characterized conversations with irate and demanding callers; that is, many reps reported a form of this closure in which they distanced themselves to preclude interrogation of roles and responsibilities in interaction. In so doing, they prevented systemic change. Our attention to situation-framing resources and knowledge-accomplishing activities provides a mechanism for identifying these moments.

Furthermore, resistance in knowledge-accomplishing activities (particularly, those moves that seek to conclude episodes) can illustrate struggles over meaning. Reliance on individuals’ expertise to locate a solution highlights
resources for legitimacy and identification, whereas deferring or tabling decision making can show how accountability and a hope for subsequent knowledge-accomplishing activity extend into the future and stretch a problematic situation across time. Additionally, cases can display efforts to exert control—for instance, one party actively contests the image of personal knowledge or the form of knowledge-accomplishing activity offered by another as a termination to an episode. When actors resist, the resources that shape situations, along with the encompassing discourses, can be laid bare.

**Unintended Consequences of Arrays of Knowledge-Accomplishing Activity**

A final implication of our framework involves its efficacy in characterizing sets of practices. Although we did not set out to catalogue problem-solving activities in a given organization, the framework can help to understand typified responses to recurrent (or even intermittent) situations. For instance, if a community’s members frame all situations as being resolvable by information transfers and requests, they may establish a system well-equipped to efficiently handle relatively routine occurrences. Yet when confronted by the nonroutine or the equivocal, such a system may find itself incapable of action such that problem-solving proceeds only in ad hoc fashion. Such a state of affairs hints at the sort of unintentional inflexibility that concerns those studying organizational dynamic capabilities (Feldman & Pentland, 2003; Schultze & Stabell, 2004) and accidents (Perrow, 1999; Weick, 1993). Hence, examining the patterns of practices that accomplish knowledge in problematic situations—which, as we have shown, simultaneously construct those very situations—can provide insight on organizational change, retention of routines, and the roles of tradition and authority (see also Kuhn, 2006). With attention to arrays of knowledge-accomplishing activities, our framework can help generate insights into the unintended consequences of routine organizational action, one of the persistent concerns of organizational theory (Conrad & Haynes, 2001; Reed, 1996).

**Conclusion**

Our framework will be useful to the increasing number of scholars working from the practice orientation of knowledge, including those in the organizational communication field (e.g., Alvesson & Kärreman, 2001; Cooren, 2004; Heaton & Taylor, 2002; Iverson & McPhee, 2002; Jian & Jeffres, 2006; Jones & Stubbe, 2004; Kuhn, 2002; Sillince, 2006; Tremblay,
2005; Zorn & Taylor, 2004), because it provides a means to systematically analyze the interactive character of knowing. It builds on practice theory and pragmatism to argue that episodes of practice within emergent problematic situations are likely to exhibit patterns in which particular forms of knowledge-accomplishing activity respond to the level of determinacy constructed in and through that very situation. With this framework, scholars will be able to investigate knowing in a systematic fashion without sacrificing the richness of a practice-based orientation. Research utilizing this framework can therefore contribute to our understanding of key issues in the study of organizational knowing: knowledge heterogeneity, struggles over meaning, and the unintended consequences of practice.

Appendix

The following comprises sections of a transcript of a problem call from the Help Center. Numbers on the left indicate the number of seconds from the beginning of the call’s recording. We have reproduced a reduced portion of the transcript of this 45-min call to illustrate the factors related to knowledge-accomplishing activity.

11.99 Rep: Help Center, how may I assist you?
12.80 Caller: Hi, uh, I, uh, uploaded some files that, that should have gone into the home page for a particular course and I can’t find them anywhere on the [university] Web site other than when I dial when I log in it indicates that they’re actually there.

. . .

84.30 Rep: Hmmm . . . ’cuz as long as you put it in the public file and as long as you’re typing in, like, the right address and everything, like, or like, um, when you—actually made it, did you make it, like, is it . . . the site off of the main site that you’re on for chemistry, is it a link . . .
99.01 Caller: I have not a clue to—when you say “the site off the main site.” What we’re talking about . . .
100.53 Rep: Okay. So is there a Web page at all?
106.43 Caller: Yes, the directory shows up. There is a directory, but the contents are empty.
111.49 Rep: Uh. Oh, like in your files that they are, once you FTP, they’re empty still. I think I’m kinda confused.

. . .

(continued)
Caller: So in other words, yes, the file, the directory, it itself exists, but there’s not files in it. When I click on, uh, on a—’cuz there’s several other people . . .

Rep: And did you FTP those files over also?

Caller: I’m telling you, I did, but I, I FTP’d them to [server] dot [university] dot edu to what, uh, were—I was told were public files. They aren’t showing up here at this URL that I just gave you.

Rep: Right. Hmm. That is kinda weird. Ummm, hold on, let me see if anybody else would know ’cuz I’m not sure why they wouldn’t show up.

[Rep requests information from another rep in the Help Center.]

Rep: Okay, um what—I just talked to somebody, and what they said, it’s not gonna show up on the site that you’re at right now; you actually have to do after all of this address. You have to say slash and then your file name that you directed over, that that you’re looking for.

Caller: Okay, so what have I got to do differently?

Rep: After your whole, like, everything you just gave me.

Caller: [Angrily] No—would you please be extremely precise? So far, you’re talking in very vague terms. I’d like to have precise instructions that I can follow!

Rep: On your URL, after the address you just gave me, all of the w, w, dot [university] dot edu slash chemistry slash chem, after all of that at the very end of that, space slash, and then the file name that you transferred over.

Caller: I don’t believe that’s true because I can see the stuff for other people’s—why can’t I see my own?

Rep: ’Cuz it’s gonna be on there, as far as I know. As far as I know, it’s gonna be after slash and your file name, ’cuz that’s what you transferred on over.

Caller: I just put it, I just put it under there, and it doesn’t show up that way. No—that’s completely bogus what you’re saying. I can see the stuff for other, uh, for other courses, at least two other people who taught chem [course number] and who still have it up there. So don’t tell me it’s not there because I can’t find it, it’s not there.

(continued)
Appendix (continued)

820.38 Rep: I have no idea—they must not have known. I wasn’t too clear on it either ’cuz as far as I know I usually just put it onto the public [server], but I guess it just works differently.

828.84 Caller: [Agitated] I, I, guess what? Would you like to talk at a 150 words a minute instead of 300? I’m sorry to be personally criticizing you, but you [breath], evidently you’re not used to having every word being understood over the telephone. I expect to be able to understand every word you say, and I’m not—and I do not have trouble hearing other people on the phone.

... 

1337.73 Caller: I mean, to me it’s silly that they don’t have any sort of site map that tells you how to get from where to where or any of that.

1348.41 Rep: And personally, I’m not too familiar with all of it either, but if we do have to get somebody to come out there, they are a lot more familiar with it. Let’s try—you know how we got to “Chem.” Let me ask if I’m doing something wrong; let me just ask somebody else—hold on.

[Second request for information from another rep, approximately 40 s. A third request occurred at 1995.24.]

Notes

1. In making these claims about central tenets, we acknowledge the diversity of practice-oriented views on knowledge and knowing (see, e.g., Nicolini, Gherardi, & Yanow, 2003). Although scholars in this camp draw on a heterogeneous mix of theories, our aim here is to extract the common concerns that distinguish a practice-based perspective from more traditional visions of knowledge.

2. Effecting change is meant broadly and can include combining ideas, designing a product, commenting on a proposal, or even engaging in conversation.

3. Methodology refers not to particular techniques for research (this is the realm of methods) but rather the more abstract stance concerning how we come to know. In the abstract stance, it refers to how researchers draw on meta-theoretical assumptions to design investigations and support claims of understanding. Thus, methodology comprises the analytic frame for research (Ragin, 1994).

4. Before ethnomethodological scholars showed how actors shape situations through an active and ongoing process of framing and reframing, “the situation” was a static construct (Turner, 1988). However, micro-sociological work showed that as people assess the context, the other, and themselves, they set expectations for what should (and should not) occur in a given situation. The model upon which we draw in this section fits within this tradition but explicitly directs attention to the setting-shaping interaction.
5. For Harrè and Secord (1972), knowledge comprises the power structure of an episode: It is part of “the permanent and transitory powers and states of readiness of the people concerned” (p. 174). In this sense, individuals’ knowledge is essential in negotiating the identifications, legitimacy, and accountability in a situation and therefore speaks to the power relations that unfold in episodes of knowing.

6. Not all knowledge-accomplishing activity occurs in interaction with others. Knowing to avoid touching a hot stove requires no social validation. (On this topic, however, see I. J. Cohen’s insistence [1989] on praxis in response to Giddens’s focus on interaction.) In terms of practice theorizing, individuals may employ what Giddens (1979, 1984) refers to as allocative resources, those resources that aid in producing some effect but do not require coordination with others. But activities involving authoritative resources—those resources that invoke the activity or agency of other actors—and even activities involving combinations of the two resource types always imply communication. Because our present interest lies in organizing and the coordinated activity that it implies, this second form of activity is more germane. Thus, individual expertise and a tacit feel for work are important insofar as they become implicated in conjoint action.

7. Cross, Rice, and Parker (2001; see also Dervin, 1992) provide a model of five benefits derived from information seeking—solutions, meta-knowledge, problem reformulation, validation, and legitimation—all of which can fit within our framework when examining actors’ motivations. But their perspective deemphasizes action, ignores the influence of ambiguity on information interpretation, and divorces motivation (and in so doing, intent) from the situations shaping it. The interactive problem solving addressed by our framework tells us more about action in organizations than do individuals’ motivations for seeking information.

8. Both development and deployment participate in system constitution; because of the complexities marking human systems, however, consciously initiated knowledge-accomplishing activities (such as knowledge management interventions) may be shaped by unacknowledged conditions of action and will thus likely produce unanticipated consequences.

9. Of course, there are other organizational settings in which those possessing unique forms of technical expertise are able to treat clients dismissively; that this situation was not the case in the Help Center (in our observations) underscores the need to understand the situational features of identification, accountability, and legitimacy to explain observable differences in knowledge-accomplishing interactions.

10. Were it possible to capture all the interactions constituting an organization (see Corman, Kuhn, McPhee, & Dooley, 2002), we might be able to access each of these dispersed interactions and might develop a sense for the flow of influence in problem definition (McPhee & Zaug, 2000). Even if access were possible, however, it raises a host of analytical concerns well beyond our scope.

References


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